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RURAL WAGES, LABOR SUPPLY AND LAND REFORM: 
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Mark R. Rosenzweig 
November 1977 
Note: Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to 
stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in publi­
cations to Discussion Papers should be cleared with the author to 
protect the tentative character of these papers. 
The research embodied in this paper was supported in part by a grant 
from the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations' Program in Support of 
Social Science and Legal Research on Population Policy and in part 
with funds from the U.S. Agency for International Development under 
order No. AID/otr-1432. 
The primary objective of this paper is to ascertain both 
theoretically and empirically the effects of a redistribution of land 
holdings on agricultural wage levels and sex/age wage differentials. 
Land reform is one of the most mentioned of the theoretical policy 
instruments discussed in the development literature, yet relatively 
little attention has been paid to the wage rate consequences of such a 
program, despite the fact that perhaps more than one half of rural 
families in a developing country receive over 50 percent of their income 
from wage earnings in agriculture. 1 One reason for this lacuna may be that 
the determination of wages and family labor supply in the agricultural 
sector of LDCs has also been somewhat neglected, particularly in the context 
of a heterogeneous labor force. 2 The subsistence or institutional wage 
models of Lewis, Fei and Ranis and Rodgers, for instance, offer no theory 
of how wage levels or differentials are set and thus provide little guidance 
on how wage rates would be affected by changes in land ownership patterns. 
More recently, Bardhan and Srinivasan, Newbery, and Bell and Zusman, who 
formulate general equilibrium market or bargaining models determining 
endogenously the rental share paid by tenant sharecroppers have assumed 
that agricultural wage rates are exogenous. In particular, Bardhan and 
Srinivasan suggest that rural wage levels are influenced only by non­
agricultural factors. 
Another reason why the potential wage impact of a land reform 
program may have received little attention is that models of "peasant" 
family behavior, such as those of Sen, Mazumdar, and Mabro, typically 
embody two restrictive assumptions which would tend to make the 
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the Research Program in Development Studies, Princeton, University. Research 
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equalization of landholdings appear wage-augmenting, although this 
implication has never been formally derived. These assumptions are that 
(1) agriculture is'dualistic',with small-farm families facing lower shadow 
prices of labor (leisure) than large-farm landlords because of impediments 
to labor mobility and (2) agricultural households are 'dichotomous' -­
"small" farmers employ family labor and maximize utility while "large" 
farms only utilize wage labor and maximize profits. As will be shown 
below, however, when this latter assumption is dropped, as appears consistent 
with data from India, the theoretical impact of a change in the distribution 
of landholdings on wage rates becomes ambiguous with the possibility that 
wage rates may fall as a consequence of a land reform despite dualism 
and/or decreasing returns to scale in agricultural production. 3 
In section I we show that there is a spatial distribution of 
agricultural wages and wage differentials for males, females and children 
across Indian districts which does not appear consistent with the 
institutional wage hypothesis or with the assumption that labor is 
homogenous. We also present descriptive data on the labor force char­
acteristics of rural Indian households by land size which indicates that 
Indian agriculture is neither extremely dualistic nor dichotomous. In 
section II, a competitive, three-sector general equilibrium model of a 
dualistic agricultural labor market with two kinds of labor, consistent 
with the features of Indian agriculture discussed in section I, is formulated 
and the stability and other properties of the equilibrium are described. 
In section III, the necessary and sufficient conditions for a land reform 
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having neutral, positive or negative wage effects are derived and 
parameterized with respect to economies of scale, the extent of 
agricultural 'dualism,' differential income-leisure effects on large and 
small farms, and the relative disparity in landholdings. The relation­
ship between the distribution of land and wage rates in a monopsonistic 
labor market is considered in section IV. Section V contains an empirical 
analysis based on the theoretical framework in which the parameters of 
a six-equation simultaneous equations system describing the determination 
of rural wage rates and labor supply for the three age-sex groups are 
estimated. The results do not support the institutional or exogenous wage 
hypotheses, indicating that rural wages are influenced by shifts in demand 
and supply within the agricultural sector. Reduced-form coefficients 
derived from the structural estimates suggest that rural wage levels and 
a measure of landholding inequality are negatively associated, but that 
an equalizing land redistribution would exacerbate agricultural wage 
differentials between males and females. 
I. Characteristics of the Rural Labor Market 
To analyze the effects of a redistribution of landholdings on 
wage rates it is necessary that the units participating in the labor 
market and their behavior be specified in at least rough accord with the 
important characteristics of rural LDC markets. One of the salient 
features of the Indian agricultural labor force is its heterogeneity. 
There are (at least) three sex-age groups -- male, female and child --
-4-
who appear to perform different agricultural tasks and who r_eceive 
different wage rates even for the same category of work. 4 The 
distribution of annual average daily agricultural wage levels and wage 
differerttials by sex and age are displayed for 159 Indian districts from 
513 states, 1960-61, in Tables 1 and 2. While the inter-district 
variance in levels might be explained away by differences in consumer 
prices, the variation in inter-group wage ratios cannot. Wage levels 
for each sex-age group do not appear to be "pushed up" against some 
subsistence level, although the number of observations does not allow 
the standard Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to discriminate among different 
hypothesized distributions. Thus, as Hansen has demonstrated for rural 
Egypt, there does not appear to be either one institutional wage or a 
'law of institutional wage differences' in India. 
Few systematic attempts have been made to explain wage differentials 
in rural agriculture based on endogenous or within-agriculture factors. 
Rodgers tries to account for differences in wage levels across the villages 
he studied, based on a nutrition-productivity linkage, by hypothesizing 
that employers pay higher wages to males whose wives, because of religious 
beliefs or caste restrictions,were not participating in the labor market 
in order to maintain the male workers' consumption standard. Boserup, 
taking a market view, has hypothesized that rural male-female wage 
differentials are smaller where women participate less in the labor market, 
thereby implying that wage levels respond in some way to differences in 
labor supply. None of these hypotheses are formally derived or tested. 
Table 3 displays various labor-force characteristics of rural house­
holds in India by gross cropped area, computed from an all-India survey 
of 5115 rural households collected by the National Council of Applied 
4-a 
Table 1 Distributions of Districts by Sex-Age Groups 




per day Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
.25-.50 16 9.0 
.50-.75 24 12.9 68 38.4 
•75- 1.00 8 4.1 67 36.0 51 28.8 
1.00-1.25 55 28.4 34 18.3 21 11.9 
1. 25-1. 50 46 23.8 25 13.7 14 7.9 
1.50-1. 75 28 14.5 20 10.8 4 2.3 
1. 75-2.00 14 7.3 9 4.8 1 0.6 
2.00-2.25 13 6.7 5 2.7 1 0.6 
2.25-2.50 18 9.3 2 1.1 1 0.6 
2.50-2.75 5 2.6 
2.75-3.00 3 1.6 
3.00-3.25 2 1.0 
3.25-3.50 
3.50-3.75 1 0.5 
Total Districts 193 186 177 
Mean Wage 1.54 1.13 0.86 
Source: Agricultural Wages :l.n India 1960-61, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
Delhi, 1965. 
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Table 2 Distributions of Districts by Wage 
Differentials for Women and Children, 1960-61 
(annual averages) 
Percent of, Women Children 
men's wages Nwnber Percent Nwnber Percent 
10-15 5 3.1 2 1.2 
15-20 
20-25 1 0.6 
25.:.30 1 0.6 
30-35 6 3.8 
35-40 7 4.4 
40-45 3 1.9 26 16.4 
45-50 6 3.8 23 14.5 
50-55 5 3.1 26 16.4 
55-60 13 8.2 22 13.8 
60-65 14 8.8 12 7.5 
65-70 15 9.4 10 6.3 
70-75 38 23.9 12 7.5 
75-80 24 15.1 4 2.5 
80-85 15 9.4 3 1.9 
85-90 8 5.0 1 0.6 
90-95 7 4.4 
95-100 6 3.8 3 1.9 
Total Districts 159 159 
Mean 79.6 55.9 
Source: See Table 1 
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Table 3 - Labor Poree Characteriatics of Rural Bouaeholda by Land Size 
1970-71 Household Data 
KUlllber of "ouse-Percent Reporting Percent Reporting Percent Reporting Hean8 Wage holds (Saq>leGross Cropped Agricultural Wage Hean8 Agricultur- Payaenta to Hean• Pa:,aenta Wages or Salary and \Percent Reporting Weight x 10-3)Area (hectares) Inco- al Wage Incoae Labor to Labor Earnings Salary Earnings Family WoriceX'Sb 
m (2} p~ (4) (5) (6) !7l (8} 
<1.5 55.1 485.3 87.7 64.5 79,0 1397,26 19.9 3.4 
(551. 3) (83.2) (1562) (20.1) 
1.5 - 3.0 70.5 522.7 83. 7 101,4 83.6 925.0 33.3 281 
(555. 7) (139.5) (1040) (16,0) 
3.0 - 4.5 54.3 389.9 78.3 138.7 71.4 812.5 42.7 199 
(500.1) (214.1) (1171) (15. 2) 
4.5-- 6.0 52.7 355.2 82.7 213.8 72.0 843.2 45.0 207 
(460.2) (413.2) (1074) (14,8) 
6.0 - 8.0 37.2 236.6 85.8 269.8 58.0 792.8 53.4 188 
(394.7) (381.1) (1276) (10.7) 
140 
(414.8) (506.3) (1430) (9.6) 
8.0 - 10.0 30.0 216.3 85.8 367.3 56.4 923.4 63.6 
22310.0 - 15.0 19.7 163.3 90.3 429.4 39.3 714.7 69.4 
(428.0) (589.5) (1585) (6.7) 
15.0 - 20.0 14.6 92.5 94.5 501.5 31.0 417.2 73.2 151 
(285.4) (657.1) (881) (5.l) 
20.0 - 25.0 12.8 108.6 91.9 639.0 35.1 579,9 69.4 94 
(314.6) (837.9) (1002) (5.6) 
25.0 - 30.0 6.9 87.8 96·.o 884.7 32,8 754.6 73.0 58 
(360.8) (1100.8) (1509) (4.5) 
8830.0 + 3.4 25.3 96.0 1316.7 21.6 431.3 79.6 
(148. 3) (1609.8) (995) (3.4) 
Total 40.4 294.3 87.0 418.7 59.3 794.6 1943 
aStandard errors in parentheses Source: NCAER, Additional Rural Income Survey (ARIS), Third Round. 
bExcludes household work 
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. 6
Economic Research for the periods 1968-69, 1969-70 and 1970-71. · 
The data in the table refer to cultivating households in 1970-71 
who provided information on all of the characteristics displayed, 
approximately two-thirds of the total number of cultivators sampled. 
One advantageous feature of this data set is that higher-income 
households were over-sampled so that more statistically reliable 
information on large landowners is provided than in most sample 
surveys. 
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 3 indicate that almost all cultivator 
households, large and small, participate actively in the labor market 
as either buyers or sellers of labor services, with almost 88 percent 
of households cultivating a gross-cropped area less than 1.5 hectares 
utilizing some hired labor. Seventy-nine percent of these small farm 
households had some family members who participated in the labor market 
(Column 5) with 55 percent reporting household members earning agri­
cultural wages. While Column 4 suggests that the purchase of hired labor 
by the smallest farms is evidently a seasonal phenomenon only, Column 2 
indicates that the total number of days in the year spent in agricultural 
market (off-farm) employment by all members of households with a gross 
cropped area less than 1.5 hectares, given on average daily agricultural 
wages in 1970-71 of about 2 rupees, is about 240 or an average of 100 
. 7 
days for each household member over ten years of age. Average days 
of off-farm agricultural work per potential household earner drops, as 
expected 
1
with (effective) land size, with only 3.4 percent of households 
with gross cropped area exceeding 30.0 hectares reporting agricultural wage 
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income, Thus these data, while not inconsistent with the existence of 
seasonal or even year-round underemployment, do not appear to support 
the assumption that agriculture in India is dualistic in the sense that 
family members on small farms cannot find substantial amounts of market 
work as hired agricultural laborers. 
Moreover, Column 7 indicates that modelling large farms as 
profit rather than as utility maximizers is unrealistic, at least in 
India. While almost 96 percent of the largest farms hire labor, 85 per­
cent also utilize family workers, where a family worker is defined in the 
survey as an individual over 10 years of age who spends the major part 
of the year working his (her) own land. The proportion of farms reporting 
family laborers declines,as expected, with farm size, with less than 20 
percent of the smallest farms reporting family workers. 
The purchase of labor by almost all farms regardless of size 
and the extensive use of family labor by the largest farms suggests that 
the "dichotomization" of cultivating households by objective function, 
small farm households maximizing utility,large farm owners maximizing 
profits and using only hired labor, would appear not only counterfactural 
but less useful than merely distinguishing large and small farms according 
to whether they are n@t importers or exporters of labor services. 
Such a distinction is particularly useful in the context of assessing 
the income distributional impact of a land reform program because it 
identified who benefits and who loses from a change in agricultural wages. 
A comparison of ·columns 2 and 4 of Table 3 indicates that the cross-over 
point, where payments to hired labor begin to exceed total agricultural wage 
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earnings, is somewhere around 6-7 hectares. Table 4, which gives the 
actual distribution of landholdings (acres) in India, 1961-62 suggests 
that almost 90 percent of all farm households are net exporters of 
agricultural labor to the market. Thus, for instance, if a land reform 
program which transferred land hela by the top 10 percent of landholders 
to landless laborers were to cause wage rates to fall, almost all land­
owning househoids would be made worse off, with the magnitude of the 
decline in real net income for each household being inversely related to 
farm size. The wage effects of a land redistribution which is only 
partial (not fully equalizing) may thus play a larger role in changing the 
distribution of incomes than the change in the wealth positions of the 
recipients and "donors" of the transferred land. 
7-a 
Table 4 - Distribution of Land-Holdings, 1961-62 
Size of Land­ Mean Farm. Percent of Percent of Total 
holding (acres) Size Total Farms Area Operated 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
0 - 1.0 0.40 18.26 1.29 16.97 
1.0- 5.0 2.64 44.06 17.74 36.32 
5.0 - 10.0 6.89 19.33 20.33 1.00 
10.0 - 15.0 11.81 7.79 14.03 6.24 
15.0 - 25.0 18.56 5.94 16.80 10.96 
25.0 - 50.0 32.88 3.58 17.93 14.35 
50.0 + 74.24 1.05 11.83 10.82 
Total 6.56 100.00 100.00 96.66 
Source: B. Sen, "Opportunities in the Green Revolution," ~conomic and Political Weekly, 
March 28, 1970, A33-A40. 
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II. The Competitive Market Model and Properties of Equilibrium 
To capture the essential features of rural agriculture highlighted in 
section I and to maintain tractability, we assume a labor market composed 
of two types of labor, 'male' and 'female', and three agricultural 
households -- a landless household and two households with different 
size plots, small and large, of quality-standardized land producing a 
homogeneous agricultural commodity. The market is initially assumed 
to be competitive so that all households are price-takers, but wage 
rates are determined endogenously. There are, however, fixed costs per 
unit of labor time spent on the land owned by other households which 
8 are assumed to be borne entirely by workers. Each household contains 
two persons, one of each labor type, each owning a unit of labor time. 
The two types of labor are imperfect substitutes in agricultural 
production but labor of each type from different households are 
perfectly substitutible.
9 
NThe landless household supplies R.fM 
N Namounts of labor to the market, where R.M and R.W are the quantities of 
leisure time of the'husband" and "wife" in the landless household. Total 
consumption of the landless family, assuming no saving and a unit price 
for the composite consumption commodity, is thus 
N
where ITK = WK - pK ( K = M,W), WK are the market wages paid to (hired) male 
and female labor and pK is the fixed cost per unit of labor time supplied 
to the market. 
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The small farm household owns AS units of land and is by 
definition a net exporter of the labor services of both the husband 
sand wife. The large farm household owns 8A units of land, where 8 
is a scalar chosen such that the household is an importer of labor. 
i iDenoting ½1 and~; i • S,L, as the total amounts of male and female 
labor utilized on the land owned by each land-owning household, the 
quantities of male and female labor supplied (exported) to the market 
S andsby the small household, AM and AW' ,11:he amounts of labor hired (imported) 
L ALby the large landowning family, AM and are given byw 
s(2) AS• 1 - LS > 0K fK K 
L(3) AL= LL - 1 > 0 K • M,WK K fK 
iwhere ifK is the total work time of family member Kon the farm of 
size i. 
The quantities consumed by the land-owning households, X
s 
and XL are thus' 
0 for i = s 
(4) xi - F(LM,
i i ej As) + Ai IIi + i • S,L j ...LW' M M A;~ 1 for i = L 
L S
where IIK • WK, IIK ~ WK - PK and Fis a twice, continuously differentiable 
strictly concave production function with positive cross-partials. 
Each of the three households maximizes an identical, twice 
differentiable family utility function, given by (5), with respect to 
ithe consumption connnodity X and the leisure of the two household members, 
each of which is assumed to be non-inferior, subject to the relevant 
budget constraints in (1) and (4). 
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(5) i = N,S,L 
If only interior solutions are considered, the necessary con-
ditions for each household, in addition to those implied by the budget 
constraints, are given by equations (6) through (8): 
(6) ui 'i'i = 0 i = N,S,L
X 
ui _ 'i'i rri(7) = 0 i = N,S,L
.Q,k K 
(8) Fi - rri i = S,L
LK K 
= 0 
where 'i'i is the Lagrangean multiplier for household i. 
Equations (7) and (8) give the standard utility and profit 
maximizing results describing the optimal quantities of leisure and total 
labor use, if any, for each household. With pK > 0, the market is 
dualistic in the sense that small landowing households utilize more labor 
per acre than large landowners because of the differential shadow prices 
of labor: < WK, FL 
L 
= WK. Each member of the small landowning house-
K 
hold allocates his (her) labor on the family's land up to the point where 
the value of his (her) marginal product just equals the net wage he (she) 
receives in the market, WK - pK. Members of the large landowning house­
holds devote all their work time to their own land and hire each type of 
labor up to the point at which the marginal value product of that labor 
type is equal to the appropriate market wage, WK. 
To derive the partial-equilibrium comparative static properties 
for the three households we first write the matrix: 
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i iui -1UX.2. UX.2.xx M w 
i ui ui -rri
UX.2. 1 MM M1M 1W1M1/ = i • N,S,L 
i i rri -rriUXR. UR.~ 1 1 ww. w w w 
-1 -rri -rri 0M w 
Differentiating equations (1), (6)' and (7) for i • N, we get 
dX 
(9) [SN] d.2.M - 1¥ N dWM - 1¥ N dpM 
N N 
d.2.W If dWW - 1¥ dpW 
N N Nd'i'N .2.N-.2..fM dWM - tfW dWw 1fM dpM dpWfW 
NS is thus the bordered Hessian matrix for the landless household. Denoting 
the determinant of Si as ~1 and the cofactor of row rand column c of Si as 
<I> 
i 
, we obtain the standard Slutsky equations for the landless household's re 
labor supply: 
N N N 
(10) d.2.fK <l>nn n +4n N N N = - - 1fK --- a - K = M, n = 1 dWK <l>N <l>N KK 1fK °K 
K = W, n = 2 
N N N 
d.2.fK <1>23 <1>4n(11) N N N- .2. --= a ---- - KhdWh fn <l>N 1fh OK<l>N 
Second-order conditions constrain the first term in equation 
(10), the compensated substitution effect, to be positive, since <I> 
N 
< 0 
and <I> N > 0. The ·normality assumption, however, implies that the income nn 
N
effect on work time, oK is negative so that equation (10) is consistent 
with either a backward-bending or positively sloped supply curve for 
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landless laborers of either sex. The sign of (11) depends on whether the 
leisure time of the husband and wife are complement or substitutes, being 
unambiguously negative if the leisure time of spouses are substitutes. 





UXR. 0 0 -1 dXi 
M W 
i 
ui u ui 
XR.M R,MR,M R,MR,W 







ui ui ui 
XR.w R,MR,W R,w¾ 







0 0 0 Fi FiYM Yw 
0 dLi 
n -dWM -Fy i dA
1 




w 0 0 0 
dlJ'i i(1i1 i- R.fM) dWM i (~ - i R.fW) dWW 
Noting that 8i is the second bordered principal minor of the bordered 
Hessian matrix in (12), and must be negative, we obtain the following results 
for the two landowning households, employing Cramer's rule: 
i i(13) 4>idifK 4>nn i i i i--= ---- (Li R,i) ~ = - (LK - n = 2,3dWK K fK 4>i crKK tfk)crK4> i 
i i i 
(14) difK 4>23 i 4>4n i i i i--= ---- (Li -= - R,fK) °Kh - (Lh - R,fh)oKn<I> i <I> i~ 
Fi 




(16) difK <P 4n i"" Fi --= -Fi < 0crKA AdAi <Pi 
i i iFi
dLi FL A - F1i<,A F½iLh(17) K h ~ = 
dAi lli 
Equations (13) and (14), which give the own and cross wage 
effects on the total supply of work time for each household member in 
the land-owning households, indicate that the substi~ution and income effects 
in those households are qualitatively similar to those of the landless 
households and are identical if the labor market is non-dualistic and 
N Scompetitive (ITK • ITK • WK) and if the utility function in (5) is homothetic. 
However, unlike for landless laborers and small landowners (labor exporters) 
the uncompensated own wage effect on total (family) labor supply in labor 
importing farms is unambigiously positive, since a wage rise must lower 
net income for these households. 
An important implication of Equations (15). and (17), giving 
the (own and cross) effects of a rise in wage rates and land holdings on 
total labor usage on the landowning farms, is that the "production" and 
"consumption" sectors of the farms are independent, as 
0 
(15) and (17) depend 
only on the properties of the production function. Thus if competitive 
conditions prevail, the partial equilibrium changes in the allocation 
of production resources will be identical whether or not (some) households 
maximize utility or profits. However as will be shown below, the assumption 
that large landowners ma:ic:f.mize utility and utilize family labor has 
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consequences for the allocation of market (non-family) labor and thus for 
the levels of the equilibrium wage rates and the stability of the rural 
labor rnarkets,which are functions of market supply and demand curves only. 
The relationship between the supply of off-farm labor of type 
K from small farms and changes in wage rates, from (13), (14), and 
(15), is expressed in (18). 
(18) 
While for K ~ h the terms in brackets, the own compensated substitution 
effect and the negative of the labor usage effect, must be greater than 
zero, (18) may be of either sign because of the positive income effect 
on leisure. We note, however, that a comparison of (18) with (10), giving 
own uncompensated wage effect on the labor supplied to the market by 
members of landless households, suggests that the market supply curve of 
(small) landowners need not be negatively sloped even if that of the 
landless households is because of the family labor effect. Moreover, 
in the corner solution case considered by Barzel and McDonald,where 
N Smembers of all households must work full-time (tfK' ifK = 1) to earn a 
subsistence income,so that an increase in the wage necessarily lowers 
total labor time initially, the off-farm participation of members of 
landowning households could increase with a wage rise if the necessary 
reduction in the use of family labor exceeds the increase in desired 
leisure time. Thus market labor supply curves in subsistence agriculture 
need not be negatively sloped, although total labor supply curves must be. 
For the labor-importing, utility-maximizing farms, the own 




Since the demand for all labor of type K to be used in agricultural 
production falls and the quantity of labor supplied by family members 
of sex K increases when WK rises,~ priori, the demand for hired labor 
must decline in response to a wage rise. Because of the latter family 
labor supply effect, (19) implies that 1) utility-maximizing large farms 
will display more elastic demand curves for hired labor than profit­
maximizing farms, and 2) that the demand for hired labor is a function 
of changes in non-earnings income or wealth. 
The effects of an exogenous increase in household landholdings 
Qn off-farm labor supply (small farms) and on the demand for hired labor 
of type K (large farms) depends also on both production and income­
leisure effects, but are of ~ambiguous signs. An increase in the size 
(20) s 
CJ - < 0K 
(21) L L 
0FA °K + > 
of labor-exporting farms will reduce their supply of labor to other farms; 
an increase in the holdings of labor-exporting households will increase 
the demand for hired labor because of reinforcing production and income­
lesiure effects. 
Labor ·market equilibrium is characterized by equations (1), 
(4), and (6) through (8) as well as equilibrium conditions (22): 
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(22) K = M,W 
A necessary condition for (Hicksian) multi-market static stability in 
the market for hired agricultural labor,from equations (13), (18), and 




The assumptions imposed in the analysis so far do not insure that condition 
(23) be met; it is thus possible that with sufficiently negatively-sloped 
market supply curves of agricultural labor, the market equilibrium will 
not be stable. However, the likelihood that static instability is the 
major reason for the existence of institutional, i.e., non-market determined, 
wages is low: positive income leisure effects in small-landowner and land­
less households must be extremely large, not only exceeding income effects 
in labor-importing households, but greater than the sum of the production 
and consumption substitution effects in all households and the income-
labor supply effect in the large households, each of which is negative 
for (23) to be violated. Indeed, the presence of labor-hiring institutions 
(large landowners) which maximize utility and employ family labor, as in 
India (Table 3), as well as the existence of labor-supplying households 
whose members both work their own land and offer labor services to the 
market, makes the fulfillment of the static stability conditions more 
likely in the context of Indian agriculture than in developed country 
(modern sector) labor markets. In the latter, where employers of hired 
labor are profit maximizers and household members who supply labor do not 
participate in household income production, three negative terms tending 
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toward stability, F~/68 , --cr~, and -AL a~, would not appear in (23). 
Moreover, because of the participation of family members in agricultural 
production on labor-importing farms, the stability condition must be 
satisfied if the utility function is homothetic (and p = 0) since the 
last three terms in (23) vanish (crKL • cr N K = 
-18-
III. General Equilibrium Comparative Statics 
Assuming a unique, stable equilibrium we can ascertain the 
effects of a change in landholdings Ai or any other exogenous variable 
hypothesized to influence supply behavior on the wage rates of the two 
types of labor by totally differentiating equations (1), (4), (6) through 
(8) and (22) and solving for dWM and dW w· First we briefly consider the 
effects of an increase in non-agricultural factors which might draw 
labor from all agricultural households. Let Z represent the stock of 
production inputs employed outside the farm sector such that dtiK/dZ < 0, 
L Si = N,S,L so that dAK/dZ > 0, dAK/dZ < O. Then for a small change in 
Z around equilibrium the effect on male and female agricultural wage 
rates can be written in terms of the partial equilibrium comparative 
i istatic results where e:KX = dAK/dX: 
(24) dWK =[
dZ 
L s N L s N(e: - e: - e:KW ) (e:hW - e: - e:hW)KWh KWh hWKh K Kwhere n = 1 - L S N L s N
(e:KW - e:KW - e: ) (e:hW - e: - e:hW)KWK hWhK K h h 
To sign (24) we note that the assumption of strict concavity in production 
and second-order conditions require that n > 0 and that if the equilibrium 
dynamically L s N L S 
is /\ stable, from. (23), (e:KWK - e:KWK- e:Kw/ < 0 and (e:lCWh- e:KWh -
10 ·, 
> 0. The first term in brackets (the own effect) must therefore be 
-19-
positive and own and cross effects are reinforcing so that an increase 
in non-agricultural capital will increase both male and female wage rates, 
the magnitude of the effect being positively related to the sensitivity 
of labor supply to changes in Zand negatively to the sensitivity of market 
agricultural demand and supply curves to changes in agricultural wages. 
This"prediction" of the competitive wage model, that increases 
in non-agricultural labor demand will raise agricultural wage levels,is 
one of the few which directly contradict one of the implications drawn 
from the nutritional wage model by Rodgers, who suggests that the presence 
of slack-season non-agricultural employment may lower all agricultural 
11 wages. 
The competitive general equilibrium model can also be used to 
demonstrate that the attenuation of factors inhibiting only female 
participation in market work, such as religious or cultural attitudes, 
will not necessarily result in wider male-female wage differentials, as 
suggested by Boserup, but will most probably lower agricultural wage rates 
generally, consistent with Rodgers 
I 
observations. To see this let R be 
an environmental characteristic such that di:w/dR, dA!/dR < O; di~/dR, 





dWM = [ dt!JdR + d;l.JdR_ ] [ (e:WWM-
dR (e:L _ e:S _ e:N ) (~1-. _ 
WWW WWW WWW MWM 
and (26) 





an increase in female market participation must reduce female wage rates 
and male wage rates as well. However, the change in 
the wage rate differential, given by (27),cannot be predicted: 
(27) Q-1 
Finally, we derive the effect of a redistribution of land 
~ithout compensation for the transfer of wealta from large to small land~ 
owners on wage rates in the general equilibrium system by solving for the 
8
effects of an increase in A on WW and WM under the side condition that 
T S 12
total landholdings, A = A (1 + e) remain constant: 
L S 
dWK e:KA + e:KA(28) 
-,-S- = L . S N[
dA ( e:KW - e:KW - e:KW ) 
K K K 
Assuming that the direct effect, the first bracketed term, 
L S
dominates, the sign of (28) depends on the sign of e:KA + e:KA' so that 





Thus whether or not a land reform program, without compensation, increases 
on 
properties of the production function and the differences in income-leisure 
or decreases the wage rates for laborers of type (sex) K depends the 
relationships for individuals of sex Kand the marginal product of land 
on small and large farms. To parameterize these relationships assume that 
h -14 sueh tat F - Qi= r!_l~ Law2 (ej A)S3t he product i on f unct i on i s Cobb- Doug1as, 
and S1+ S2 < 1. Expression (29) can then.be rewritten as: 
(30) 
1-a 
s [ w -p · h 
_ a L L a(y-1) ( K K)l-S1 -S2 SJ> 0- a •
µ 3 S OK W K < 
A K 
The following conclusions emerge: 
1) With no factor distortions (p•O) linear homogeniety (y•l), increasing 
returns to scale (y > 1), or decreasing returns to scale (y < 1) are each 
neither sufficient nor necessary for land redistribution to be wage 
s . 
neutral (dWK/dA • 0), wage augmenting, or wage decreasing because of 
income-leisure effects. With y•l, moreover~ the differences between 
income-leisure effectsin small and large farm households will uniquely 
determine the direction of the wage effect, assuming compensation, if any, 
is not complete. Since that differential may be of opposite sign for 
males and females; it is possible that land reform could raise wage rates 
for one group while lowering them for another. 
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2) In the special case, considered by Gersovitz, 'Mabro and others, in 
which the production function is linear homogeneous and large farms are 
owned by profit maximizing absentee landlords (no employment of family 
labor so oKL = O), wage rates of men and women will rise unambiguously, 
the magnitude of the rise, from (28), being a negative function of the 
sensitivity of the demand and supply of hired labor to wage rate changes 
and a positive function of the magnitude of the income-leisure effects 
on small farm households. In this case, the wage group benefitting most 
from the land reform will be that which has the greatest income elasticity 
of leisure and the most inelastic market demand and supply curves. 
3) Sufficient but not necessary conditions for land reform to be wage 
neutral under competitive conditions (with p•O) are that the production 
function be linear homogeneous and the utility function be homothetic; 
neither assumption by itself is necessary or sufficient. 
4) "Dualism"in agriculture does not necessarily imply that land reform 
will increase rural wages. Moreover, rural wages can rise after a land 
reform without factor distortions. However, the greater the costs to 
workers of off-farm employment, the more likely will wages rise as a 
result of a land redistribution. To see this, differentiate (30) with 
respect to Pi<_, noting that Bh < 1. 
(31) 
5) Finally, by differentiating (30) with respect to the relative land 
size parameter e, to obtain (32), it can be seen that if production is 









[r -+ aK -> <8 (y-L)( X K)l-61-62 )l-61-62 ~ L 63 g:](32) -(y-1) wWK AS AS 
as y = > 1 
< 
the greater the differential between the original landholdings of farms 
from whom land has been taken and the size of the holdings of households 
receiving the land, the more positive (negative) the impact of such a 
• land distribution on agricultural wages. 
In general then, if the agricultural labor market is competitive 
or contains factor distortions which are invariant with respect to the 
allocation of resources the direction of the effect of a land redistribution 
program on agricultural wages cannot be known a priori without imposing 
prior restrictive assumptions or without evidence concerning scale 
15economies · and differential income-leisure effects for large and small 
farm households. Moreover, knowledge of the quantitative impact of land 
reform on wage rate differentials requires information as well on market 
supply and demand elasticities characterizing different groups of agricultural 
labor. In the next section it is shown that these agnostic conclusions hold 
a fortiori in the case of a partial land reform program carried out under 
conditions of imperfect competition, even if agricultural labor is homogeneous. 
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IV. Land Reform and Monopsony 
. The major theoretical justification for implementing a land 
reform program may not lie in either the exploitation of scale economies 
(which may be non-existent or perverse) or in the improvement of the 
distribution of incomes (which may, as shown above, worsen) but in improving 
the bargaining power of landless laborers and small landowners vis-a-vis 
large, labor-importing landowners. Assume that the distribution of land­
holdings is such that the labor-importing household is a utility-maximizing, 
family labor-using monopsonist facing an upward sloping supply curve for 
M M Mhired labor, L - tf = A , supplied by landless and small landowner house-
holds. · To reduce complexity assume further that all households contain 
16only one individual and all agricultural labor is homogeneous. The 
monopsonist maximizes the utility function. 
subject to the income (consumption) constraint 
First order conditions are: 
(35) ~- 11 :a 0 
X 
(36) lf1 - 'i'M w*< l+n;1> = 0t 
(37) - w ( * l+n-1 8) = 0~ 
-1where = (f1) 'AM/W * ns 
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Since labor-importing and landless households behave as before (equations 
S N * (6) - (8), with II , II = W) the exercise of monopsony power by the large 
landowners results in a dualistic agriculture (even with p•O) - the marginal 
value product of labor and the marginal value of leisure on large monopsonistic 
farms exceeds the observed market wage, W,* which is equal to the marginal 
value product of labor and the marginal value of leisure on small farms. 
Total labor per acre on small farms will thus exceed that on large farms, 
as~> w*, F~ = w*.l? 
In the absence of significant scale economies a land redistribution 
scheme which eliminated the monopsonistic exploitation of hired workers 
would thus be likely to increase agricultural wages. However, a partial 
redistribution of land which placed more land in the hands of small land­
owners but did not significantly improve their bargaining power in the 
labor market could lower wage rates still further; moreover, the effects 
are ambiguous~ priori even when scale and income-leisure effects are 
known. To show this we totally differentiate equations (1), (4), (6) 
through (8), i a S,N, equations (34) through (37) and the equilibrium 
condition (38) 
(38) 
with respect to A8 , holding AT constant, solving for dW*/dA8 around equilibrium. 
Ag~in -for tractability we assume that production is described by a Cobb­
Douglas production function Q • 1 81 (8jA8) 82 , 0 < 81 < 1, 83 > O. After 
* stedious manipulation, the sign of dW /dA can be shown to depend on the 
sign of (39). 
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(39) 
* W, i=S 
where rri • { * -1w (l+n8 ), i = M 
which The direction of the agricultural wage change (if any) 
caused by a partial land redistribution implemented under a monopsonistic 
regime depends not only on scale economies and the differential in the 
income-leisure relationships in large and small farm households, as in the 
competitive case, but also on the curvature and elasticity of the supply 
curve faced by the monopsonistic farm. Thus, for instance, conditions of 
linear homogeniety in production and homotheticity of the utility function 
would not guarantee that such a land reform program would be wage-neutral 
because of the dualism inherent in the monopsony case: the suppliers of 
market labor and the monopsonist face different shadow prices of labor and 
leisure. 
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v. Empirical Analysis 
A. Variables and Reduced-Form Estimates 
The principal implication of the preceding theoretical analysis 
is that the direct impact of a land redistribution program on agricultural 
wage rates is indeterminate. As was demonstrated, however, data per-
taining to scale economies and the labor supply elasticities of landless 
and landowning households would provide only indirect evidence on the 
consequences of land reform policy and would not, in any event, indicate the 
quantitative magnitude of its impact on rural wages. · In this section we 
adopt a more direct approach, utilizing aggregate district-level data from 
India to estimate the direct ceteris paribus relationship, if any, between 
the size-distribution of landholdings and the wage rates of adult males, 
adult females, and children in the agricultural sector, thereby obtaining 
a quantitative estimate of the potential wage-impact of a land redistribution 
program. We also seek empirical answers to more fundamental questions con-
cerning the agricultural labor market: first, whether the differential levels 
in annual agricultural wage rates across Indian districts, as presented in 
Table 1, are importantly influenced by the variation in factors contained 
within the agricultural sector, in contrast to the view expressed by 
Bardhan and Srinivasan, and second, more specifically, whether inter-district 
differences in rural aggregate market labor supply and demand influence wage 
levels,in contrast to the institutional wage hypothesis. 
We first estimate a set of six reduced-form equations in which the 
levels of the agricultural wage rates of adult males and females and children 
(WAGEM, WAGEF, WAGEC) and the number of wage laborers per household in each 
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sex-age group (LABM, LABF, LABC) are the dependent variables, using 
aggregate cross-sectional data pertaining to the rural populations in 159 
18Indian districts, 1960-61. The maintained hypothesis motivating the 
empirical analysis, to be tested below, is that inter-district labor 
mobility in India is sufficiently low such that district-level characteristics, 
whether institutional, non-institutional, outside or inside the agricultural 
sector, are the important determinants of district wage rates and market 
labor supply. 
Each of the six equations, described in (40) and (41), contains 
an identical vector 
-(41) 
where W= WAGEM, WAGEF, WAGEc; L • LABM, LABF, LABC; 
-yf} = NOLAND, AVLAND, DIST; ~'"' RAIN, IRR; Xz • URB, FACTRY, FUEL, 
SCALE; ~ = MOSLEM; -X: = PLANTN; XE "" PRIMM, PRIMF, MATM, MATF, 
CASTE 
of exogenous explanatory variables X which includes~' a 3xl column vector 
of variables characterizing the size distribution of land - NOLAND, the 
proportion of households in rural areas without land, AVLAND, the mean 
holdings of landowners, and DIST, a measure of landholding inequality 
among landowners, the Kusnets ratio, given by (42). 19 
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where Pj = total number of landowning households in district j 
Pij = number of landowning households in interval i in district j 
Aj = total landholdings (acres) in district j 
Aij = landholdings in interval i in district j 
Characterizing the distribution of land at the upper tail is a dummy variable 
PLANTN, which takes on the value of 1 if a district contains plantations. 
Other variables included in X standardize for differences in land-augmenting 
factors (~), and represent non-agricultural demand factors. (XZ) and other 
rural population characteristics and institution.a ("1, XE); 8n and bD are 
3x3 matrices, aR and bR are 3x2 matrices, az and bz are 3x4 matrices, ap, 
hp,¾{ and bM are 3xl vectors, and aE and bE are 3x5 matrices of coefficients; 
e and e 2 are 3xl column vectors of error terms. All variables are listed1 
and defined in Table 5, which also provides means and standard deviations. 
The Bardhan - Srinivasan exogenous wage assumption, iil. its extreme 
form, is that at least some of the elements in az are positive, while those 
of aD, 8R' 8M' 8p, aE = O. The nutritional wage theory of Rodgers suggests, 
however, that the variables in Xz and agricultural wages are negatively 
correlated, i.e. the elements in az<O. The market, endogenous wage model 
described in sections II and III predicts that az> O, from (24), and 
suggests, in addition, the following: (1) The coefficients of AVLAND, IRR 
and RAIN should display positive signs in all wage equations since an 
increase in average landholdings, or land-augmenting factors, per house­
hold, controlling for the distribution of land among landholders and the 
proportion of landless households, from (20) and (21), would increase the 
29-a 
Table 5- Variable Definitions, Means, and Standard Deviations 
159 Districts,a India 1960-61 
VARIABLE DEFINITION MEAN s.d. 
WAGE Daily wage in rupees for male field labor 
(sowers, reapers, weeders, ploughers) 
1.52 0.43 
WAGEF Daily wage in rupees for female field labor 
(sowers, reapers, weeders, ploughers) 
1.11 0.37 
WAGEC Daily wage in rupees for child field labor 
and herding 
0.85 0.37 
LABM Percentage of males per household aged 15-59 
working at least one hour per day as hired 
agricultural laborers 
23.4 11.2 
LABF Percentage of females per household aged 15-
59 working at least one hour per day as 
hired agricultural laborers 
22.0 14.4 
LABC Percentage of children per household aged 
5-14. working at least one hour per day as 
hired agricultural laborers 
5.75 3.98 
PRIMM Percentage of males 15-:-59 with primary 
education 
12.7 9.27 
PRIMF Percentage of females 15-59 with primary 
education 
3.34 4.11 
MATM Percentage of males 15-59 with secondary
education 
2.44 2.50 
MATF Percentage of females 15-59 with secondary 
education 
0.27 0.68 
RAIN Average normal rainfall per year in cm. 302.2 584.2 
IRR Percentage of cultivated acres irrigated 12.8 17.4 
DIST Kuznets ratio of land-holding inequality 81.7 16.3 
AVLAND Average land owned per land-owning household. 12.4 10.3 
NOLAND Percentage of households without land 34.9 13.1 
MSLM Percentage of population Moslem 33.2 66.6 
CASTE Percentage of population in scheduled tribes 12.8 6.32 
URB Proportion of population living in urban areas 0.17 0.11 
PLANTN Dummy• 1 if at least one plantation in district 0.10 
FACTRY Factories and workshops per household 0.17 0.18 
FUEL Percentage of factories and workshops using 
power 
20.5 19.2 
SCALE Percentage of factories and workshops employing 
5+ persons 
3.9 4.0 
a States covered: Andhra Pradesh, Aaaam, Bihar, Gujurat, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, 
Madras (Tamil Nadu), Maharashtra, Mysore, Orissa, Punjab (and Haryana), Uttar 
Pradesh. 
Source: See Appendix 
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demand for hired labor on labor-importing farms and decrease the supply of 
off-farm work from labor-exporting households. (2) The proportion of house­
holds without land, NOLAND, should be positively associated with the employ­
ment of wage laborers and negatively correlated with the wage levels of 
all sex-age groups, since landless household should supply more labor to 
the market than those households owning land. (3) The DIST coefficients in 
the wage equations should give estimates of the net impact of a small change 
in the distribution of land among landowners on wage levels, which, as was 
demonstrated in prior sections, cannot be predicted a priori. (4) PLANTN, 
however, should be positively correlated with all wage levels (and market 
employment) unless, as suggested, by Boserup's observations concerning women's 
20 wages, plantations exercise monopsony power in the labor market. 
The OLS reduced-form parameter estimates are presented in Table 6. 
The set of district-level variables X explains approximately 47 to 35 
percent (adjusted for degrees of freedom) of the interdistrict variation in 
rural ma.le, female and child wage rates, with the highest explanatory power 
being obtained for adult male wages. The same variables account for 53 to 
60 percent of the variation across districts in wage laborers per household 
for the three sex-age groups. 
The results clearly reject the hypothesis that agricultural wages 
are determined only by factors outside the agricultural sector, as the 
~_n R Eremoval of the individual sets of agricultural variables, :X-, X, X, 
together and singly reduce significantly the explanatory power of each of 
Table 6 - Unrestricted Reduced Form (OLS) Coefficient Estimates, 30-b 
Indian Districts, 1960-61 
Independent D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b 1 e 
Variable WAGEM WAGEF WAGEC LABM LABF LABC 
AVLAND .0187 .0136 .0054 -.0594 -.124 -.0030 
(4.66) (3.81) (1.40) (0.61) (1.05) (0.09) 
NOLAND -.0018 -.0018 -.0004 .380 .405 .0906 
(0.53) (0.59) (0.13) (4.57) (4.04) (3.32) 
DIST -.0133 -.0101 -.0062 .355 .430 .120 
(6.39) (5.42) (3.12) (6.96) (6.99) (7. 22) 
IRR .0059 .0033 .0006 · .0413 -.0166 -.0052 
(2.69) (1.66) (0.31) (O. 77) (0.25) (0. 30) 
RAIN .0003 .0002 .0001 -.0006 .0024 .0004 
(3.20) (2.69) (1.18) (0.32) (1.04) (0.67) 
URB .501 .514 .318 -14.13 -10.78 -3.88 









































































PRIMM .0140 .0091 .0099 .219 .133 -.0483 
(2.44) (1.79) (1.81) (1.56) (O. 78) (1.05) 
PRIMF -.0019 .0064 -.0040 -.152 -.282 -.0260 
(0.14) (0.51) (0.30) (0.44~ (0.68) (0.23) 
MATM .0095 .0056 .0002 -.262 -.189 -.118 
(0.64) (0.43) (0.13) (0. 72) (0.43) (1.00) 
MATF .0793 .0280 .0792 -1.83 -5.58 -1.58 













S.E.E. • 331 .295 .318 8.09 9. 77 2.65 
-2
R .465 .424 .349 .534 .587 .603 
t-values in parentheses 
Number of districts• 159 
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the wage and employment equations (F-tests, 1 percent level). The set of 
non-agricultural variables do, however, significantly influence agricultural 
employment and wages, with nine of the twelve coefficients in az displaying 
signs predicted by the market model, in contrast to the nutritional wage 
hypothesis, although only five are individually statistically significant. 
Of these variables,the presence of factories with power engines in rural 
areas and proximity to urban areas appear to have the most significant 
impact on agricultural wage levels and employment. 
The coefficients of the landholding variables, AVLAND, RAIN and 
IRR also display the predicted signs in the wage equations, the coefficients 
being statistically significant in all but the child wage equation. NOLAND, 
as expected, is positively associated with the proportion of laborers in 
agricultural employment, and has a (small) negative affect on wages. 
Most importantly, the coefficients of the land distribution variable, 
strongly significant in all equations, suggest that wage rates of men, 
women and children are lower and market employment higher where the dis­
tribution of land is most unequal. Moreover, the presence of plantation 
agriculture appears also to reduce wage rates for all three groups, ceteris 
paribus, although the PLANTN coefficients only approach statistical signi­
ficance for men and women and are insignificant in the· child wage and employ­
ment equations. The unrestricted reduced-form coefficients thus suggest that 
a redistribution of land among landholders which reduced landholding 
inequality would raise agricultural wages in India. The differences in 
the DIST coefficients in the WAGEM, WAGEF, and WAGEC equations, statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, however, suggests that reductions in land 
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inequality would exacerbate arithmetic sex-age wage differentials in rural 
areas. 
Of the remaining variable coefficients, the results suggest that the 
presence of Moslem households iricreases the wage rates received by women and 
children but does not appear to increase male wages, in contrast to Rodgers' 
notion that employers pay higher wages to Moslem men in order to compensate 
them for the lack of market participation by their wives. Boserups' 
wage-differential labor supply hypothesis is thus given some support, although 
the negative relationship between MOSLEM and LABF is not statistically 
significant. Indeed, CASTE appears to have a stronger impact on both 
agricultural wages and employment than does the religion variable. 
B. Structural Estimates 
To more fully explore the market wage hypothesis, we estimate 
structural demand and supply equations for hired labor, described by (43) 
and (44): 
(43) j = 1. •. 159 
(44) 
where a ,BW are 3x3 coefficient matrices; the dimensions of all other1 
variables and parameter matrices are defined above. 
Each of the six structural equations satisfies the rank and order 
conditions for identifiability. The assumptions underlying the coefficient 
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restrictions imposed are: (1) Non-agricultural demand factors Xz 
influence only the off-farm supply of landless and small landowning 
househclds, not significantly attracting members of large farm families 
away from family agricultural employment and thus not affecting the demand 
for hired agricultural labor. (2) The XR variables influence only the 
demand for hired agricultural labor since land-augmenting factors do not 
directly affect the quantitiy of labor supplied by landless households. 
(3) Plantation agriculture, pertaining only to. large farms, influences wages 
directly, and/or the demand for hired laborers, but not the supply of wage 
labor. (4) Moslem does not affect the demand for hired labor since it would 
only have a deterrent effect on female off-farm labor supply and thus should 
not influence the supply of family labor on labor-importing farms. In addi­
tion, because of multicollinearity, we set the off-diagonal elements of 
the BW matrix equal to zero, thus abstracting from cross-wage effects on 
household labor supply to the market. We also include only the "own" 
21education variables in the demand equations. 
We have chosen to specify the demand equations in (43) with the wage 
rate as the dependent variable so that the direct influence of labor supply 
changes on wage rates can be more easily tested. If wage rates are influenced 
by shifts in supply and demand, as assumed in the theoretical analysis, the 
diagonal elements in the a matrix should display negative signs since from1 
(25), an increase in the quantity of labor of type K must have a negative 
"own" wage effect in equilibrium. The cross-effects are likely, from (26), 
to be negative as well. 
The theoretical analysis also suggests that AVLAND, IRR, and RAIN 
should be positively associated with the demand for hired labor and that the 
demand for wage labor should be greatest_ in areas where the value of DIST 
is highest if the labor market is competitive, since where the distribution 
of landholdings is more unequal more land is likely to be held by labor­
importing farm households. If, however, the inequality in landholdings 
in some districts is sufficiently high such that large landowners are 
monopsonistic, the relationship between DIST and wage rates paid (demand for 
wage labor) may be negative, reflecting monopsonistic exploitation. Similarly, 
the coefficients of PLANTN will exhibit negative signs in the demand equations 
if plantation agriculture is monopsonistic, as suggested by the reduced-form 
results. The schooling attainment variables, however, should be positively 
correlated with the demand for hired labor if more educated members of labor­
importing households tend to be employed in non-agricultural jobs rather 
than as family laborers. 
With respect to the supply equations, the own wage effects on labor 
supply are theoretically ambiguous as was shown; however, the model suggests 
that the proportion of landless households and the degree of landholding 
inequality should be positively associated with LABM, LABF, and LA.BC, from 
(20), since an increase in DIST or NOLAND is equf.¥alent to a reduction in 
the landholdings of labor-exporting households. Similarly, an increase in 
AVLAND would decrease the supply of market workers per household. Both 
the non-agricultural demand and the schooling coefficients should display 
negative signs in the agricultural labor supply equations; the former 
because unskilled labor would be attracted to employment opportunities outside 
of the agricultural sector, the latter for at least three reasons: (1) An 
increase in schooling, given the agricultural wage level, may increase pro-
-35-
ductivity on the small farmer's own land, thus increasing family relative 
to market labor time. (2) If schooling increases agricultural productivity, 
there would b~ a positive wealth effect on leisure time which would reduce 
total labor supply. (3) Schooling may augment non-agricultural skills and 
thus be positively associated with participation in non-agricultural 
employment. 
Because of omitted or non-measurable variables the error terms . ' 
in the six equations are likely to be correlated, especially those within 
the sets of demand and supply equations, as is confirmed by inspection of 
the residual correlation matrix in Table 7 obtained from the estimation of 
(43) and (44) by two-stage least squares. Accordingly, we estimate the system 
of market demand and supply equations using full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) to capture the potential efficiency gains indicated by the 
22
residual correlations. As a check on the robustness of the specification to 
estimation technique and as insurance against a likelihood function with 
23 
undesirable properties, we also employ three-stage least squares (3S1S). 
24 
The parameter estimates obtained, which have the same asymptotic properties, 
are indeed quite close and are displayed in Tables 8 and 9. We discuss the 
FIML estimates over those obtained using three-stage least squares because 
of the additional invariance property of FIML, which may be of importance 
because of our placement of wages on the left-hand side of the demand equations. 
The structural coefficient signs are generally consistent with the 
expectations generated by the market Ill()del of rural agriculture. In parti­
cular the matrix of supply variable coefficient signs in the demand equations 
is supportive of the market hypothesis, as wages appear to be sensitive to 
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Table 7 - Residual Correlation Matrix, Structural Equations 
India Districts 1960-61 
WAGEM WAGEF WAGEC LABM LABF 
WAGEF .645 
WAGEC .348 .761 
LABM .0182 -.104 -.249 
LABF -.0928 .135 -.0186 • 774 
LABC - • 296 .0461 -.372 .549 .756 
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Table 8 -FIMI. Coefficient Estimates, 
Indian Districts, 1960-61 
Independent 
Variable WAGEM 
D e 2 e n d e n t 
WAGEF WAGEC 
Variable 
LAllM LABF I.ABC 
LABM -.0055 -.0342 -.0501 
(0.39) (0. 24) (0.31) 
LABF -.0285 -.0321 -.0325 
(2.49) (2.78) (2.30) 
LABC -.0295 -.0440 -.0395 







AVLAND .0170 .0131 .0058 -.173 -.328 -.0441 

























IRR .0060 .0022 .0002 
(3.41) (1,23) (0.10) 
RAIN .0003 .0002 .0001 
(4.41) (3.44) (1.54) 
PRIMM .0149 .153 .0092 -.136 
(4.51) (1.01) (0.04) (1.35) 
J!RIMP .0122 -.217 -.474 -.0057 









MATF -.117 -3.54 -6.59 -2.58 







SCALE -.211 -.248 -.102 







PLANTN -.278 -.353 -.277 
(2.21) (2.88) (1.95) 
U1tB •12.49 -18.U -4.74 
(1.61) (1.65) (1.52) 
C.&STE -.0015 -.0004 -.0057 -.296 -.838 -.281 
(0.25) (0.07) (0.83) (1.92) (2.82) (1.79) 
MOSLEM .0411 -.0092 -.0229 
(2.32) (0.33) (1.38) 
Constant 1.64 1.16 0.92 -37.30 -49.74 -12.59 
(7 .37) (5.13) (3.55) (2.50) (2.51) (2.01) 
S.E.E. .302 .302 .377 8.60 12.43 4.04 
Aaymptotic t~Taluea in parmathuea 
Number of districts• 159 
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Table 9-3SLS Coefficient Eatimatea,•Indian Districts, 1960-61 
Independent D e 2 e n d e n t V a r i a b 1 e 
Variable WAGEH WAG!l WAGEC I.ABM LABP I.ABC 
I.ABM -.0013 -.0280 -.0426 
(0.10) (0.22) (0.31) 
LABP -.0257 -.0282 -.0290 
(2.23) (2.47) (2.29) 
I.ABC -.0332 -.0474 -.0430 
(0.84) (1.36) (1.15) 






AVLAHD .0164 .0129 .0053 -.0115 -.242 -.0313 
(4.21) (3.33) (1.28) (1.02) (1.51) (0.65) 
NOLAHD .0067 .0041 .0006 .376 .393 .0792 
(1.43) (0.82) (0.11) (5.01) (3.75) (2.35) 
DIST -.0057 -.0019 -.0033 .395 .552 .161 
(1.17) (0.37) (0.64) (5.26) (5.18) (4.02) 
till .0055 .0021 .0005 
(3.19) (1.18) (0.28) 
RAilf .0003 .0002 .0001 
(4.07) (2.98) (1.37) 
PllIHM .0160 .160 .0088 -.119 
(4.38) (1.14) (0.05) (1.50) 
PRIMP .0129 -.115 .281 -.019 
(2.13) (0.35) (0.57) (0.14) 
KA'l'M .0085 -.275 -.392 -.161 
(0.76) (0.80) (0,80) (1.17) 
KATF -.114 -3.25 -6.37 -2.41 
(0.27) (2.04) (2. 97) (2.92) 
PACTllY -4.167 -7.29 -3.26 
(1.04) (1.31) (2.14) 
SCALE -.174 -.173 -.099 
(0.76) (0.53) (1.16) 
FUEL -.034 -.257 -.0568 
(0 •.74) (3.19) (1.39) 
PLAlfTH -.288 -.360 -.298 
(2. 36) (2. 97) (2.42) 
UllB -14.87 -19.27 -5.04 
(2.22) (1.97) (1.66) 
CASTE -.0006 -.0002 .0051 -.257 -.737 -.244 
(0.10) (0.04) (0.80) (1.84) (3.07) (2.04) 
!l>SLEM .03'7 -.0006 -.0180 
(2.37) (0.03) (1.37) 
Coutant 1.61 1.13 0.86 -34.12 -43.84 -11.47 
(6.91) (4.91) (3.51) (2.51) (2.49) (1.82) 
S.E.E. .316 .302 .369 8.52 11.74 3.72 
Asymptotic t-valuea in parentheses 
Number of districts• 159 
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shifts in the supply of laborers for hire such that increases in the 
number of people participating in the agricultural labor market, from 
any age-sex group, reduces all agricultural wage rates. The negative 
supply effects of males and children on their respective wage rates are not 
statistically significant, however. The strongest supply impact on wages 
appears to come from shifts in female participation -- a ten percent increase 
in the number of women working as hired laborers reduces their own wage 
rate and those of males and children by four, six, and eight percent 
respectively. Contrary to Boserup's observation, however, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that an increase in female labor supply has 
equal negative effects on male and female wages -- differences in female 
market participation are therefore not a proximate cause of the 
variation in male-female wage differentials across Indian districts, 
although they do significantly affect wage levels. 
The supply equation structural estimates suggest that the relation­
ship between the quantity of laborers in each sex-age group supplying labor 
to the agricultural labor market and the level of wage rates is positive, 
although none of the wage coefficients are statistically significant by 
conventional standards. The coefficients of the land distribution variables 
suggest that the expected reduction in female market p~rticipation in response 
to decreases in landholding inequality would be significantly greater than for 
the other two sex-age groups, although reductions in the proportion of land­
less households would appear to decrease male and female participation equally. 
The market participation of children appears least sensitive of the three 
groups to alterations in the distribution of landholdings. 
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All of the coefficients of the Xz variables also display the 
correct signs, although all but two do not achieve statistical significance 
at the 10 percent level (one-tailed test). Of the schooling variable 
coefficients, 10 of the 12 are of the "right" sign but the only statistically 
significant coefficients are displayed by MATF. Indeed, the schooling 
attainment of women above the primary level appears to be more strongly 
related to their market participation in agriculture than does being in a 
Moslem household. Males, however, appear to participate more in market 
employment where Moslem households are more prevalent. CASTE appears to 
inhibit the supply of laborers to the agricultural labor market, parti­
cularly women. 
Land size and land-augmenting variables have the expected posi-
tive effects on the demand for hired labor; increases in rainfall and 
irrigation, however, would appear to raise the demand for male labor 
significantly more than for female or hired wage labor. The most interesting 
result in the demand equations, however, is the negative signs displayed by 
the DIST coefficients, which indicate that where landholding inequality is 
greater, the demand for hired labor (wages offered) is lower for all three 
groups. The distribution v~riable coefficients thus suggest that the 
negative relationships between landholding inequality and wage rates obtained 
in the reduced form may not be the fortuitous net result of favorable scale 
(dis-) economics, dualism and/or income-leisure differentials but rather 
may reflect the restriction of wages and employment by large landowners, 
consistent with the monopsony model. This result is supported by the 
negative and stati~tically significant PLANTN coefficients in the demand 
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equations. 
An equalization of the distribution of landholdings would thus appear 
to have a strong negative impact on the supply of agricultural market labor 
but negligible effects on hired labor demand, with the net result that 
landholding inequality and rural wage rates are negatively and significantly 
associated. To obtain a rough estimate of the quantitative impact of a land 
reform program on the level of agricultural wage rates and wage differentials 
we compute the derived reduced-form coefficients from the FIML structural 
parameters, reported in Table 10, which should give quantitative estimates 
of the relationships between DIST, wages and wage labor employment which are 
asymptotically more efficient than the unrestricted reduced-form parameters. 
Using the actual distribution of landholdings in India (1961-62), reported in 
Table 4, we consider as one example a policy of placing a limit of 51 acres 
on all farms and then redistributing the "excess" holdings so that no 
landowning farm household would own less than 1.5 acres of arable land. It 
can be easily be shown that this would reduce the Kusnets ratio , computed in 
column 5 of Table 4 for the displayed landholding distribution,from 97.7 to 
2577.1, a decline of approximately 21 percent. The FIML reduced-form 
coefficients indicates that such a land reform policy, in the absence of other 
changes, would raise male wage rates by 16. 5 percent, ·female wage rates by 
2617.0 percent and child wages by 14.1 percent. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have investigated the wage effects of redistribution 
of landholdings by formulating competitive and monopsonistic rural labor market 
models with particular attention to labor heterogeneity and the determinants 
of off-farm labor supply. Although the models were constructed to be 
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Table 10 - Derived (FIML) Reduced Farm Coefficient Estimates 
Independent 
Variable 
WAGEM WAGEF WAGEC LABM LABF LABC 
AVLAND .0189 .0136 .0057 -.0445 -.0703 -.0052 
NOLAND -.0005 -.0005 -.0012 .3659 .3811 .0872 
DIST -.0130 -.0098 -.0062 .2414 .4201 .1191 
IRR .0051 .0020 .0003 .0351 .0385 .0022 
RAIN(Xl0-2) .0196 .0149 .0057 .1337 .2828 .0496 
URB .1975 .2419 .0502 11.147 13.524 4.307 
FACTRY .0595 .1545 .0792 -4.116 -5.606 -2.629 
SCALE .0010 .0034 -.0002 -.2041 -.1827 -.1035 
FUEL .0043 .0060 .0058 -.0091 -.1708 -.0187 
MOSLEM -.0004 .0012 .0018 .0383 .0136 -.0075 
CASTE .0090 .0151 .0171 -.2340 -.5516 -.1326 
PLANTN -.2143 .2115 -.1642 -1.462 -4.004 -1.426 
PRIMM .0110 .0061 .0095 .2288 .1255 -.0530 
PRIMF .0050 .0134 -.0017 -.1826 -.2205 -.0087 
MA1M .0098 .0070 .0024 -.2605 -.3083 -.1373 
MATF .1011 .0430 .1094 -2.846 -5.780 -1.633 
Constant 2.01 1.38 0.75 -23.61 -23.64 -6.12 
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consistent with the important features of the agricultural labor market in 
India, they are sufficiently general and can be easily altered to suit 
structural conditions in the rural labor markets of other developing 
countries. The wage impact of a partial land reform was found to be theoretically 
indeterminate, due mainly to the assumption, consistent with household-level 
Indian data, that land-owning labor exporting and importing households 
/.::employ family labor so that market labor supply shifts are affected by 
opposing wealth-leisure effects. However, the empirical results suggest 
that a redistribution of land from large to small farm households in India 
would raise agricultural wage levels significantly and thus benefit landless 
households, although sex-differentials in rural wages would appear to widen. 
The econometric results also tend to support the hypothesis that 
the Indian rural labor market is competitive, suggesting that inter-district 
wage differences can be attributed to geographical differences in the 
relative positions of market labor supply and demand curves. The results 
also suggest, however, the existence of monopsonistic wage and employment 
attenuation in areas characterized by a high degree of land-holding inequality. 
The question remains, however, why disparities in agricultural wages across 
districts persist in India despite the apparent mobility of members of small­
farm households between their own land and that of other .land-owners: The 
high proportion of the wage labor force accounted for by members of land­
owning households,however, suggests that with land (capital) market imper­
fections geographical mobility of hired laborers as a whole would be 
relatively low. Thus although the empirical results do not explicitly take 
into account migration, the quantitative estimates of the wage-land distri­
bution relationships probably do not merely represent short-run effects. 
Moreover,the analysis would suggest that the transfer of land to landless 
laborers, while increasing wage ~ev~ls, would reduce the geographical mobility 
of agricultural labor and thus increase_the spatial dispersion of rural wages. 
'40. 
APPENDIX 
Sources of Data: 
Agricultural Wages in India, 1960-61, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
Delhi, 1964- WAGEM, WAGEF, WAGEC. 
Census of India, 1961, Office of the Registrar General, New Delhi, 1965 
Part IIB - LABM, LABF, LABC, RAIN, PRLMM, PRIMF, MAIM, MATF, MOSLEM 
Part IIC - AVLAND, NOLAND, DIST, URB 1 
Part IVB - FACTRY, FUEL, SCALE 
Indian Agricultural Statistics. 1961-62 and 1962-63, Volume II, Directorate 
of Economics and Statistics, New Delhi, 1970 - IRR, PLANTN 
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1. Notable exceptions are Berry, Gersovitz, and Rahman. All of these authors, 
however, employ geometric analyses, with differing assumptions leading to 
wholly different "predictions" regarding wage effects. None consider the 
heterogeneity of agricultural labor, pay attention to questions of stability, 
or attempt to apply their models to data. 
2. Information on the differential impact of alternative agricultural policies, 
including land reform, on sex or age specific wage rates is not only 
important in settling income distribution and equity issues but, as suggested 
in Rosenzweig and Evenson, may have significant implications for population 
growth and schooling as well. 
3. In addition to these assumptions, Berry, who emphasizes the possibility of 
a wage decrease following a land redfstribution, abstracts from labor-leisure 
choices in all households. Gersovitz, in his non-dualistic example assumes 
production is characterized by constant returns-to-scale and rules out 
negatively-sloped labor supply curves. Rahman assumes constant-returns­
to-scale production and neglects labor-leisure choice. 
4. From a tabulation of monthly wage rates for males, females and children 
by task from Agricultural Wages in India, 1960-61, Directorate of Economics 
and Statistics, Delhi, 1964, we find that over 95 perc~nt of total months 
show male wages for ploughers while less than 10 percent report wages for 
women or children. Child and adult male wage rates are reported for over 
90 percent of total months in the category I herding,
I 
while less than half 
show female wages. Tasks such as weeding, sowing and reaping, however, 
appear to employ men, women, and children equally, although at different 
wage levels. 
45. 
5. The wage levels for each group were computed for all districts in the 13 
states listed in Table 5 which reported wage rates for that group for 
field labor or animal herding at least one month of the year. The 159 
districts are those which reported wages for all three sex-age groups. 
6. For a more detailed discussion of this data set, see Sarma. 
7. The average numbers of potential earners in households cultivating less 
than 1.5 hectares is 2.4, increasing significantly with average land 
size. Farms with 30 hectares or more reported an average of 5.6 household 
members of working age. 
8. These costs are assumed to embody search and direct transportation costs and 
reflect the value of the disutility of off-farm work and the difficulties 
of distributing family income among members when some individuals are 
employed away from home. Considerable complexity is introduced into the 
analysis if these costs vary with the extent of market work. 
9. We also assume that the land market is imperfect, such that the distribution 
of land is fixed, ignore other agricultural inputs, and abstract from un­
certainty, seasonality, and land tenure considerations. 
10. The second inequality embodies the condition that wage laborers of each 
type are gross substitutes, which guarantees dynamic local stability for 
all speedsof adjustment. See Arrow, Block and Hurwicz. 
11. With alternative sources of incomes (and nutrition) for agricultural laborers, 
farm owners are able to lower agricultural wages withou reducing work 
efficiency. 
12. It may be argued that comparative statics based on differential equations 
is an inappropriate tool of analysis for examining large-scale land re­
distributions. However, most actual or contemplated land redistributions 
are likely to be only marginal. It is also likely that any radical land 
46. 
reform programs which were to be enacted would be accompanied by 
structural changes as well, thereby violating ceteris paribus assumptions. 
13. The degree of compensatiol.Ycan be easily introduced· into the analysis as 
a parameter. As long as compensation is not complete, so that both the 
recipients and the donors of land experience opposite changes in real 
wealth (apart from indirect wage effects), income-leisure effects will 
be relevant. 
14. Bardhan, fitting a number of alternative functional forms to Indian production 
data, could not reject the Cobb-Douglas function. 
15. The evidence is mixed. Wellisz, using aggregate pooled time-series data 
from Artdhra Pradesh, concluded that agricultural production was characterized 
by increasing returns to scale. Bardhan, however, found evidence of decreasing 
returns to scale in paddy agriculture and constant returns to scale in wheat­
growing areas based on individual farm data from seven Indian districts. 
16. We also abstract from the possibility that the monopsonist may "discriminate," 
paying different wages to laborers in different sex/age groups based on 
their market labor supply elasticities. In that case the group with the 
most inelastic market supply curve would receive the lowest wage. 
17. However, unlike in the competitive dualistic case, the consumption and 
production "sectors" in the monopsonist household are not independent. Thus 
changes in the demand for leisure by members of the monopsonist household, 
due to changes in non-earnings income, for instance, will alter total labor 
usage on the monopsonist's land. 
18. These are the same districts from which the wage distributions of Table 2 
were taken, the criterion being that wage rates be reported for at least 
one month of the year for all three groups. The districts selected are 
thus not necessarily representative of India as a whole although they cover 
a wide geographic area. 
47. 
19. This measure was chosen for computational ease and because of its well­
known property of being sensitive to changes.occurring at the tails of 
the distribution, where a land reform program is likely to operate. 
Experimentation with alternative distributional parameters, such as the 
log-variance and the Gini coefficient, on a subset of districts produced 
insignificant changes in results. 
20. Alternatively, lower wages in plantation agriculture may reflect greater 
employment security. 
21. Inclusion of the complete set of schooling variables in all demand equations 
resulted in slightly high-er (asymptotic) coefficient standard errors for 
all variables. 
22. See Rothenberg and Leenders. 
23. There is a possibility that the FIML estimates will converge where the 
likelihood function is at a local rather than a global maximum. Moreover, 
the FIML estimates may not be "good" if the likelihood function is 
characterized by a flat top (plateau). 
24. See Sargan. 
25. A finer division of landholdings would enable the computation of the wage 
effects of a less radical, but perhaps more realistic, land redistribution 
program. 
26. Thus relative sex/age wage differentials are diminished but arithmetic 
differentials are increased as a result of an equalization of landholdings. 
